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Judicial Selection In Context: The
American and English Experience
BY BURTON ATKINS*

INTRODUCTION

As often happens, a single episode, and not necessarily an
important episode in the larger scheme of things, provides a
useful point of departure for discussing broader issues. The
Supreme Court's decision in Amalgamated Food Employees v.
Logan Valley Shopping Plaza' is such an episode. In Amalgamated the Supreme Court ruled that employees working in a
privately owned shopping mall had a first amendment right to
picket at their place of employment, notwithstanding the fact
that their protest took place on private property. Amalgamated
turned out to be a fascinating decision. It demonstrates how the
Court adjusts the meaning of the Constitution to changing notions of what constitutes public and private rights. The Court
concluded in Amalgamated that since privately owned shopping
plazas were a functional equivalent of public places, employees
of a business in the plaza did not lose their constitutional rights
when entering it for the purposes of picketing. Amalgamated
also shows, or to be more precise, events after Amalgamated
show that the reference points which define the parameters of
constitutional rights are sometimes indeterminate; they, like the
rights themselves, are subject to change over time. Indeed, the
Amalgamated principle was short-lived. In 1972 the Court lim* Professor and Chair, Department of Political Science, Florida State University;
B.S., University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1966; M.A., University of Kentucky, 1969;
Ph.D., University of Kentucky, 1970. Some of the research reported in this paper was
supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation (SES-86-7878) and by grants
from the Florida State University Foundation. I would like to thank Mr. Stuart Cole,
Chief Librarian of the Supreme Court Library, The Royal Courts of Justice, London,
for providing me the use of the facilities at the library for the purposes of collecting
data on the English Court of Appeal and for the use of the Court's transcripts of
judgments in order to assemble the data base. Mr. Gavin Drewry, Reader in Social
Administration, the University of London, provided many hours of his time helping me
understand the intricacies of the English legal system. Neither he, nor Mr. Cole of

course, are responsible for any errors of fact or interpretation in this paper.
391 U.S. 308 (1969).
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ited the impact of Amalgamated by ruling in Lloyd v. Tanner2
that the right of expression in privately owned shopping malls
was limited by the purpose of the expression. When expression
had a direct relationship to an activity occurring in the mall, as
did the labor picketing in Amalgamated, first amendment rights
could prevail over private property rights. But when expression
bore no direct relationship to an activity at the mall, as did the
anti-war protest in Lloyd, the balance between the competing
rights was to be tipped in favor of private property values, and
in 1972 the Court was inclined to balance differently than it had
in 1969. In fact, Lloyd turned out to be a precursor of more
change to come: in 1976 the Court revisited the larger issue
raised in Amalgamated and Lloyd, and ruled in Hudgens v.
NLRB 3 that Amalgamated should be reversed. In effect, the
Court eliminated the constitutional right that had been established in Amalgamated to express oneself in a privately owned
shopping mall.
These cases pose a simple question for those of us interested
in understanding decision-making in the Supreme Court: Why
did the Court change its view on this issue between 1969 and
1976? One answer can be derived from the opinions written by
Justice Powell in Lloyd and Justice Stewart in Hudgens. These
cases suggest that the balance between public and private rights
is dependent upon the purpose and type of expression involved.
However, once having arrived at that position in Lloyd, the
Court was wary of making the limits of protected expression
dependent on its content. Since Amalgamated and Lloyd were
in conflict, said Stewart in Hudgens, Amalgamated was overturned.
As the opinion of the Court, this explanation, as valuable
as it is, derives from a process of doctrinal justification by which
the Court explains to its various publics the basis for change in
policy. There is, however, a possible alternative explanation that
is less reliant on doctrinal coherency: that between 1969 and
1972, when the logical foundation of Amalgamated was undermined, the six-member majority that formed in Amalgamated
was not able to reassemble in Lloyd. The Amalgamated majority
consisted of Marshall, who wrote the opinion of the Court,
2 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
3 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
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Warren, Fortas, Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart. Dissenting were
Black, White, and Harlan. By the time Lloyd was decided in
1972 the appointments of new justices by President Nixon had
changed the composition of the Court appreciably. Warren retired and was replaced by Burger, and Fortas resigned under
pressure and was replaced by Blackmun. At that point the Amalgamated majority no longer existed. When Lloyd was decided
in 1972 a new majority had formed centering around Powell and
Rehnquist, who replaced Black and Harlan respectively, both of
whom had dissented in Amalgamated. Both Burger and Blackmun joined in the Lloyd majority, along with White, the lone
remaining dissenter in Amalgamated. The remnants of the Amalgamated majority-Marshall, Brennan, Douglas, and Stewartdissented in Lloyd. Lloyd, then, was a harbinger of more change
to come in Hudgens, change precipitated in large measure by
the impact of the Nixon appointments to the Supreme Court.
The Amalgamated-Lloyd-Hudgens decisions illustrate an important proposition: court decisions are, in large measure, dependent upon the individuals who sit on the bench. Of course,
we cannot always expect to find as clean a correspondence
between membership change and doctrinal change as we observe
in these cases. The private shopping mall decisions should be
viewed as an exceptionally vivid illustration of a larger phenomenon. But the sequence does remind us that the process of
judicial selection, as well as the results of that process, are
important for understanding why courts reflect particular profiles of political values. Thus, to understand judicial selection,
both in terms of its process and its impact, is to understand in
large measure judicial politics. And this raises broader questions
about the politics of judicial selection as a subset of the politics
of the recruitment of political elites.
I.

RECRUITMENT IN CONTEXT

As the papers presented in this Symposium indicate, the kind
of issues addressed under the umbrella of judicial selection is
quite broad. The issue I wish to address concerns the social
background of the people selected for the bench. Social background theory has provided insight into the dynamics of judicial
recruitment and has had important implications for theories
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explaining judicial behavior. 4 It is not my intention to review
that body of literature here. Rather, I wish to raise some questions about the relevance of social background theory for judicial
recruitment and how the contextual basis of a political system
might affect such relationships.
As a starting point we should observe that social background
studies have almost exclusively been cross-sectional and intrasystematic in design. That is to say, social background studies
have examined the characteristics of judges and their implications for decision-making on particular courts, usually in single
systems and usually at one point in time. Although social background studies have provided some exciting findings, they have
not addressed certain broader problems. For example, most have
not considered explicitly whether the characteristics of judges
change to any appreciable extent over time and whether such
changes, if detected, affect decision-making. By the same token,
the relative change in social background characteristics in judges
in different courts and at different tiers of the judicial system
has not been examined. Finally, little research has examined how
stability or change in the composition of judicial elites parallels,
or perhaps deviates from, the evolutionary characteristics of
other political elites. These are important questions because to
assume stability over time contradicts substantial literature that
addresses the issue of the transformation of political elites as a
general phenomenon.5 Thus, Sidney Ulmer's research on the
possibility that social background studies may be time bound
6
alerts us to an important agenda for future research.
But if much is lost in our understanding of judicial recruitment by not having drawn upon a longitudinal dimension, so
too has our understanding of judicial recruitment as a larger
social and political process been hampered by not extending our
research through a comparison between and among nations. A
4 See S. GOLDMAN & T. JAHNIGE, FEDERAL COURTS AS A POLrnCAL SYSTEM (3rd
ed. 1985) at 146-49 for a useful summary of this literature. An especially useful study
is Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 Am. POL.
Sci. REv. 355-67 (1981).
1 For a discussion of elite transformation see R. PutNm, THE CoMPm_ARATw
STUDY OF PoLTicAL ELrrEs 166-214 (1976).
6 Ulmer, Are Social Background Models Time-Bound?, 80 Ams. POL. Sci. REv.
957-67 (1986).
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comparative framework provides a contextual basis for understanding relationships detected, and sometimes taken for granted,
in the American political process. We need to be alert to the
fact that much comparative politics literature has explored the
problem of "American exceptionalism." This is the proposition
that much of the social and economic basis of American politics,
and to some extent its institutional basis as well, is a deviant
case from the patterns observed in other countries. Of course,
every country is unique in some fashion. But the extent to which
any one country deviates from the general pattern is what provides the tell-tale clues about the susceptibility to generalization
of the propositions we take for granted.
At first impression, at least, the American judiciary and
certainly the Supreme Court seem exceptional when compared
to other judiciaries around the world and exceptional even in
comparison with European systems that have served as the basis
for much of this "exceptionalist" literature. There seems to be
something unusual about the confluence of events in America
that has allowed its judiciary, and its Supreme Court particularly, to emerge as a key participant in the national political
process. These events have in the main taken different routes in
other countries. To the extent that this is the case, we need to
be more circumspect in how we evaluate the relationships presumed to exist between judges' social backgrounds and their
decisions on the bench. Indeed, it is wise to note that context,
even in one political system, affects greatly the proposition we
assume to be valid. For example, social background theory has
been very useful for understanding decisions made by the United
States Supreme Court.8 But findings from research on lower
federal and state courts have been decidedly more mixed in terms
of the utility of social background theory for explaining judicial
behavior. 9 In other words, the greatest currency for social back-

It is one measure of the growing significance of the exceptionalist model that
a research conference at Nuffield College, Oxford, was devoted solely to this problem.
Conference on American Exceptionalism, April 14-16, 1988.
See, e.g., Tate, supra note 4; Ulmer, supra note 6.
'See, e.g., J. HowARD, COURTS OF APPEALS IN m FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM
(1981); Goldman, Voting Behavior on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, Revisited, 69 Am.
PoL. Sci. REv. 491-506 (1975); Songer, FactorsAffecting Variations in Rates of Dissent

in the U.S. Courts of Appeals in JUDICIAL. CONFLICT

AND
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ground theory is derived from analysis of the United States
Supreme Court, a court that by most appraisals is an exceptional
judicial institution embedded in what is, in many respects, an
exceptional political system.
As we explore the politics of judicial selection in the United
States, with special attention to the social background characteristics of judges, it thus proves useful to assess the American
system in relation to other systems around the world. In such a
comparative context, is the politics of judicial selection in America as exceptional as American politics is purported to be? Is
there anything about the characteristics of judicial elites in America that distinguishes them from judicial elites elsewhere? Does
the pattern associated with the evolution of American judicial
elites, embedded in the evolution of American institutional elites
generally, parallel the evolution observed in other countries?
These are among the questions that ought to form part of a
broader agenda examining judges' social backgrounds in relation
to judicial recruitment.
It is not my intention, however, to examine the social background characteristics of judges in a variety of systems. 10 Instead, I wish to take a closer look at one system, the English,
in order to gain some perspective on how we should interpret
background characteristics of those people we recruit to the
bench in the United States. The English setting is useful for
several reasons. Some are obvious, such as the fact that both
countries share a common language and contain legal cultures
with common roots. But more importantly, the contextual basis
of the judiciaries in each country is quite different. Indeed, they
represent virtually distinctive types, or models, of what the relationships between courts and the broader political systems are
assumed to be within the common law family of legal systems.
For example, American courts are, by most reckonings, highly
integrated into the mainstream of the political process." A genStrtms OF A ERiCAN APPELLATE COURTS 117-38 (S. Goldman & C. Lamb eds. 1986)
[hereinafter JuDIcIAL CoNFLIcT].

,o Some useful comparative data can be found in J. Schmidhauser, Comparative
Judicial Elites (presented at the 12th Congress of the International Political Science
Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 9-14, 1982).
" There is an extensive literature on the relationship between courts and the
political process. Two extremely useful compendiums are S. GOLDMAN & A. SARAT,
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eration of scholars has made it part of our conventional wisdom
that American courts are highly politicized, or to say it in a
more benign way, American courts are an important component
of the larger mosaic of politics and policy-making in the United
States.
This is true along a variety of dimensions such as the recruitment of judges and the political importance of the decisions
judges make. By contrast, the English judiciary operates at the
periphery of political power, at least according to virtually every
observer of English politics. 2 This fact, according to most assessments, is the result of many forces, some historical as the
judiciary sought protection by extreme independence, some
structural as power became fused in parliament, a prime minister, and a cabinet, and some constitutional as the power of
judicial review never took root in the absence of a written
constitution and a written bill of rights. The combined result of
these forces is that judicial recruitment in America operates in
a system that is virtually a model type of a judiciary highly
integrated into the mainstream of political activity. In contrast,
English judicial politics operates, at best, at the periphery of
power. Differences such as these make the English context an
alluring one for evaluating judicial selection from the perspective
3
of social background theory.1
II.

JUDGES AS POLITICAL ELITES

A comparison of two systems can locate subtle or commonplace events in sharp relief, especially when the two systems
being compared contain distinctive features, as do the American
and English. By moving to a broader comparative context, however, we must by necessity impose some structure upon the scope
of our search for clues relating judicial recruitment to larger
systematic themes. For example, we can assume as a point of
AMERICAN COURT SYSTEMS: READINGs IN JuDiciAL PROCESS AND BEHAVIOR (2d ed. 1989);
S. U.LMER, COURTS, LAW AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1981).

Contra J. GiumnIT, THE POLmCS OF THE JUDICIARY 15-48 (1977).
,s For further discussion about contextual differences between the American and
English judiciaries, see B. Atkins, Integration and Control Function in Judicial Hierarchies: The English Court of Appeal and the Context for the Use of Appellate Review
Power (paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., August 31 - September 4, 1988).
12
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departure that both the process used by a political system to
select its officials and the characteristics associated with the
people so chosen reflect general values prevailing in and driving
the system. The recruitment of institutional elites, be they legislative or executive officials, bureaucrats or judges, leave bold
tracks by which the values of the system can be assessed. Elite
14
theorists have written about such things for some time now.
While contemporary social science has debated extensively where
one searches for evidence of a power structure, there is little
doubt that much political power stems from institutional roles.
Certain people possess power because they hold positions deemed
to be important in terms of how a society distributes valuable
resources. One need not accept, of course, that power be defined
exclusively in these terms, but it is safe to assume that positions
in certain institutions are at least among the important sources
of political power.
Once accepting this much, it is a short step to some of the
important propositions about the distribution of power that form
the basis of elite theory: that power is unequally distributed
across various groups in society; that leadership for institutional
roles is drawn disproportionately from the middle and upper
strata of society; and that the individuals so selected are therefore likely to possess a certain power profile associated with the
upper economic and social strata of society. Simply put, the
individuals who occupy key institutional positions are rarely
representative of the population at large even when the political
culture places a premium on open recruitment and participation,
as does the American system. 5
The characteristics of American judges seem to confirm, in
general terms at least, the primary tenets of elite theory. For
example, when measured in terms of their social characteristics,
American judges are unrepresentative of the general population.
Of the 104 justices who have been appointed to the Supreme
Court, less than 10o have been female and less than 1% have
been non-white. Less than half (42%/o) have come from the ranks
" The

classic works here are R. MICHELs, PoLmcAL PARISmS: A SOcIoLoOIcAL

STUDY OF OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES IN MODERN DEMOCRACY (1952); G. MOSCA, TlE

RULING CLASS (1939); V. PARETO, MIND AND SOCIETY (1935).
11See R. PuTNUM, THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF POLITICAL ELrrE (1976) (excellent
summary of elite theory cast into a comparative context).
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of the federal and state judiciaries, and this is a generous figure
since it includes anyone whose immediately prior position was
on the bench regardless of whether or not they had occupied it
for a number of years or whether they had been recruited to the
lower bench in order to provide an immediate stepping stone to
the Supreme Court. Finally, about 31% were drawn from the
about
ranks of government service, either state or federal, and
16
a quarter (24%) were drawn from private law practice.
The characteristics of the 216 judges chosen for the federal
appeals courts during the administration of Presidents Johnson
to Reagan are only marginally more representative: only 7.4%
have been women (and 69% of those were appointed by one
president, Carter, during a single term), about 8% have been
non-white (70% of these again by Carter), about 59% had prior
judicial experience, only about half (52%) could claim their
previous occupation to have been in the judiciary, and only
3.7% had been drawn from outside the administration's political
party. 17
American state supreme court judges show somewhat greater
diversity, but they, too, are hardly a representative cross-section
of the American population: only 3.1% of state supreme court
judges are female, less than 1% are non-white, most have held
some kind of political office prior to assuming their seat on the
supreme court (about 20% had been state legislators and about
22% had been prosecutors before moving to the bench), and
most have had strong ties to state and local political parties and
organizations even if they have not occupied formal political
office as such." In fact, the relationship between the party
affiliation of state supreme court judges and the distribution of
partisan preferences in the states' broader political systems is
striking and suggestive of the overlap between the partisan characteristics of judges and the distribution of political power:
90.6% of the judges on supreme courts in states dominated by
,6 These data are taken from H. ABRAAM, JusnTcEs AND PRESIDENTS: A PoLmcAL
HISToRY OF APPOINTMENTS TO THE SUPREME COURT (2d ed. 1985) (compiling data about
the background of Supreme Court justices); D. O'BmiEN, STORM CENTER: THE SuPRE E
CoURT IN AmmiucAN PoLImcs 46 (1986).

,1 These data are drawn from Goldman, Reagan's Second Term JudicialAppointments: The Battle of Midway, 70 JUDICATuRE 324, 331 (1987).
,1 Glick & Emmert, Stability and Change: Characteristicsof State Supreme Court
Judges, 70 JUDICATURE 107, 109 (1986).
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the Democratic party are Democrats; 72.4% of the judges in
modified one-party Democratic states are Democratic; 46.6% of
the judges on state supreme courts in two-party competitive
states are Democrats, and only 20.5% of the judges on state
supreme courts in states dominated by the Republican party are
Democrats. 19 In short, there is a strong relationship between the
partisan characteristics of judges and the underlying partisan
distribution in the various states themselves.
These data concerning the non-representative characteristics
of American judges are, themselves, indicators of a broader
parameter that defines the limits to representativeness on the
bench; namely, that virtually all hold law degrees, and large
numbers of them had been practicing attorneys at some stage of
their professional careers. The fact that the study of law is all
but a pre-condition to entry into this subset of institutional elites
may seem obvious. Yet law school education as a virtual precondition sets in motion prior contingencies that structure elite
recruitment. For example, most judges have had an undergraduate education and, at least until recently, most have been male
because the occupation from which they are chosen has itself
been male dominated. At least in terms of gender, the sociology
of occupations provides a basis for understanding the sequence
of events that establishes at least one parameter for the effective
pool of recruits selected for the judiciary in America.
Principles derived from the elite theory, then, provide a
general context for evaluating the characteristics of American
judges. 20 As we compare judges in America and England and,
equally as important, seek to place selection in context, it is
useful to focus upon three themes found often in the elite
literature: 1) as my discussion thus far has suggested, the characteristics of the individuals chosen to occupy formal positions
of authority; 2) related to their characteristics, the extent to
which the recruitment system is "permeable," that is, the extent
to which the institutional office-holders in question are recruited

"

These data were assembled by the author.

See generally T. DYE, WHo's RuiN io

AmERICA? THE CONSERVATivE YEARs
(4th ed. 1986) (showing comparability between courts and other institutions with data
on the characteristics of members of other political institutions and the American power

structure generally).
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from diverse public and private sectors of the system; and 3) the
characteristics of the "selectorate," that is, the persons or groups
21
involved with, or who in fact control, the selection process.
These themes are, of course, sufficiently general to allow comparison across a number of institutions and across a number of
political systems. I shall use them in the discussion that follows
in order to sort through the contextual basis of judicial selection
in England and America. It is, however, also useful to compare
the two systems in terms of two additional concepts. The first,
"recruitment demand," concerns the number of offices, judgeships for example, that need to be filled, controlled to reflect
differentials between large and small systems such as America
and England. The second, "recruitment pool," refers to the
number of people available for selection in its broadest sense.
Insofar as judges are concerned, recruitment pool refers to the
number of lawyers in each system as a proportion of the population.
A.

The Context of English and American JudicialRecruitment

Certainly on the basis of recruitment demand and recruitment pool, the English and American systems differ substantially. The United States, with a federal system governing a large
territory, has a large number of judges, 28,379 to be exact, made
up of 27,636 state judges and 743 federal judges. 22 By contrast,
England and Wales, with a land area comparable to that of the
state of New York, has far fewer judges. The central superior
court in London, composed of the Judicial Committee of the
House of Lords (England's court of last resort), the Court of
Appeal (the intermediate appellate court), and the central trial
courts in the High Court have a total of 113 judges. An additional 361 full-time circuit judges sit in Crown and County courts
around the country. There are, then, only 474 full-time judges
occupying the main judicial posts in England. If we add to this
total the 432 part-time recorders in Crown and County courts
we arrive at 906, a figure still many times smaller than in
America.
21 See R. Pu'TNum, supra note 15, at 53-57 (discussing the concepts of "permea-

bility" and "selectorate").
2 H. STurhPF, AMERICAN JUDIciAL PoLmics 66 (1988).
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It seems obvious that a country as large as the United States
would require far more judges than England. But are the sizes
of the judiciaries comparable when the size of the jurisdictions
are taken into account? If we start from the assumption that
the size of a judiciary reflects, in large measure, the demand for
judicial services (putting aside whether or not increasing the size
of a judiciary creates demand) the ratio between the number of
judges and the population served is a useful benchmark for
comparison. On this score, at least, the American judiciary is
considerably larger than the .English. The population of the
United States is about four times as large as that of England
and Wales, but it has about thirty times more judges, even if
we include the part-time English recorders in the calculation. If
we focus only on full-time judges, the American total soars to
fifty-eight times the English.
There are also differences in the size of the potential pool
from which judges are recruited. For all intents and purposes,
the recruitment pool can be defined most broadly in terms of
the numbers of lawyers in the system, since having a law degree
is one of the few absolute thresholds that defines inclusion in
the recruitment class. Of course, the variety of additional factors
(such as availability of nominees, career paths, and visibility)
serves to reduce this very large class to the effective recruitment
pool. Nonetheless, the threshold pool is a useful measure to use.
On this basis the United States has an exceptionally large number
of lawyers both in absolute numbers (649,000 in 1984) and in
relative terms (about one lawyer for every 364 people).Y By
contrast, England has about 46,700 solicitors and barristers.24
This represents about one lawyer for every 1,070 people, a rate
approximately one-third of that in the United States. These
figures, however, still grossly underestimate the actual differences because only the barrister branch of the legal profession
is eligible to serve on most superior courts in England. In reality,
then, the potential pool of nominees is thus restricted to the

2 Curran, American Lawyers in the 1980's: A Profession in Transition, 20 L.
"D Soc. REv. 19-20 (1986). See generally S. VAGO, LAW AND SocIETY 262-63 (2d ed.
1988).
. See P. Smrm & S. BAILEY, Tim MODERN ENGLISH LEGAL SYsTEM 103, 110
(1984).
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approximately 5,000 members of the bar. This translates to a
lawyer-to-population ratio of one to 10,000 in the context of the
availability pool from which judges are drawn. Thus, England
has a far smaller judiciary than does the United States and at
the same time an inordinately smaller pool from which judges
are recruited even taking population differences into account.
Viewed differently, the proportion of the population that, by
the most generous of standards, might be available for a judgeship in America is far greater than in England, and the greater
number of people available can be tapped to fill considerably
more judgeships in America even when adjusted for population
differences.
The size of the legal professions and judiciaries in England
and America provides two parameters that differentiate the politics of judicial selection in each country. Both the fragmentation
and decentralization of the American system and the highly
centralized unitary English system impose additional contextual
constraints. It is, however, one thing to be a member of an
occupation that serves as a reservoir of judicial candidates and
quite another to be selected to sit on the bench. Between the
occupation, which defines the de facto pool in its broader sense,
and the actual selection to the bench are a variety of filters that
narrow the pool considerably. One filter, or in reality a set of
different filters, is composed of the judicial selectorate-the
individuals, groups, and institutions that are charged formally
and informally with the actual recruitment. When viewed in
terms of selectorates the American and English systems diverge
considerably, and this divergence reflects deep-rooted cultural
values and institutional constraints.
The decentralized, federal, and pluralistic American system
employs a variety of processes and selectorates for recruiting
judges. At the federal level, the appointment of judges extends
both formally and informally across the executive and legislative
branches of government, drawing upon the constitutional provision that the president nominates and the Senate confirms
judicial appointments. This formal arrangement is but the surface feature of a complex political process. There are multiple
actors in the executive and legislative branches interacting with
a highly partisan political process that extends into state politics,
especially in the context of appointments to federal district courts.

KENTUCKY LAW
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Depending upon a variety of factors, such as the level of the
nomination, interest groups can use the fragmented political
process to find a forum in either branch of government to
support or to oppose candidates. The recruitment of state judges
in each of the fifty states is a veritable "crazy quilt" of processes. To say that some states elect their judges while others
appoint them would identify an important difference in the types
of selectorates that determine who is recruited to the bench. But
for all the general differences between electoral and appointive
systems, 25 there are a multitude of others reflecting differences
between partisan and non-partisan election schemes, between
legislative and gubernatorial selection, and among various merit
selection plans-plans that combine appointment and electoral
formats while including a formal role for the state bar associations. 26 To make matters more complex, many states mix recruitment systems by electing trial judges in either partisan or
non-partisan formats but then using merit selection schemes to
recruit appellate judges. Sorting through these differences reveals
that the features of selection systems are even more indistinct.
Many judges sitting on courts in elective systems were in fact
appointed to the bench as interim replacements made by the
governor.
These diverse recruitment schemes, both state and federal,
reach deep into the fabric of the decentralized and diverse American political process. What is interesting about American judicial recruitment is not so much that multiple routes exist to the
bench as much as that considerable diversity exists in the selectorates operating in these diverse channels. Thus, judicial recruitment in America mirrors the larger setting in which politics
operates. American politics is fragmented and decentralized, but
so too is the process by which American judges are selected.
This correspondence between political context and recruitment process holds true in England as well. The formal process
of selecting judges to the superior trial and appellate courts in
England is, compared to the process in America, simple and

2

See Atkins, JudicialElections: What the Evidence Shows, 50 FLA. B. J. 152-57

(1976).
See Atkins, Merit Selection of State Judges, 50 FLA. B. J. 203-11 (1976)
(summarizing state merit selection plans).
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straightforward. According to England's constitutional conventions, appointments to the appeals courts, the Judicial Committee in the House of Lords, and the Court of Appeal below it
are made by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister.27
In reality, however, the primary focus of responsibility lies with
the Lord Chancellor, who recommends nominees to the Prime
Minister after having consulted with influential members of the
bar and, at times, with members of the judiciary itself. Appointments to the High Court are again made by the Crown, but the
Lord Chancellor has a major role in the recruitment of these
28
judges as well.
The functional simplicity of this process is the product of a
fusion of two dimensions that structure the recruitment of English judges. In the first place the English system is not premised
upon a separation of powers principle. In America, the urge to
divide power, to allocate responsibility for the recruitment of
federal judges, for example, in both the legislative and executive
branches, creates a variety of access points, both within and
between the branches, at which interests can attempt to influence
appointments. In England, political power is concentrated, first
by combining legislative and executive powers in the parliamentary system and, second, by fusing it further within a Cabinet
composed usually only of members drawn from the majority
party in Parliament. Thus, the fact that the selection of English
judges is the responsibility of the Lord Chancellor, a member
of the Cabinet, is to underestimate the significance of English
centralization. It is, rather, centralization of political power,
partisan and otherwise, deeply rooted in the accumulation of
political power generally at the top.
The second dimension to the concentration of the selectorate
is that England is a unitary political system. To say that England
is unitary is, in one sense, to state a basic principle of government. Yet the absence of states with their own constituencies
and their own judicial system, and hence the absence of building
blocks that local interests can use to compete for influence in
the recruitment of judges, means that fewer access points exist
through which influence over recruitment can be channelled. In
17 See SmITH & BAILEY, supra note 24, at 159-64. See also S.
ON TRu. 46-84 (1976).
1 See generally SmrH & BAiLEY, supra note 24, at 159-64.
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fact, while England is highly centralized only in comparison with

the United States and not in any absolute sense, because it is
unitary, the regional differences that do exist receive recognition
only at the behest of the centralized regime.
Indeed, this political centralization, fusing the system verti-

cally and horizontally, interacts with a centralization of the legal
profession. I had noted earlier that the relatively large American
judiciary has a broad based occupational pool of lawyers that

serves as the threshold recruitment pool. 29 Although the judicial
recruitment systems used in the United States assume a law
degree as a condition for entry into the judiciary, lawyers constitute a large and relatively diverse group as an occupation. It
is easy to assume that lawyers are an occupational elite in the
United States. For example, by one estimate, one out of nine

lawyers is a millionaire, their average annual income is $121,913,
and their net worth averages $500,000.0 Considerable variation,
however, does exist in the legal profession in terms of the size

of the law firms, the incomes received, and the personal net
worths. And while many lawyers recruited to the federal bench
are drawn from the upper strata of their profession, the fact

remains that the state bench represents a point of entry for
diverse sectors of the legal profession, especially in those states

that use judicial elections. 3 '
The occupational basis that serves as a precondition to ju-

dicial recruitment in England is fundamentally different. In the
first place the Bar is highly structured and stratified by function

32
between approximately 41,000 solicitors and 5,000 barristers.

See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
S. VAGo, supra note 23, at 270.
11The 1988 judicial elections in Leon County, Florida, serves as an illustration.
In these elections ten candidates competed for seats on the trial courts serving the county
and surrounding areas (circuit and county courts). The average annual income derived
from law practices among these candidates was $55,523, and their average net worth
was $202,171 (Tallahassee Democrat, August 22, 1988). Both of these figures are far
below the national averages reported by Vago. In addition, state judges are drawn
typically from the ranks of graduates of state universities and state university law schools.
The educational background of judicial candidates in Leon County, Florida, conforms
to this pattern. Of the ten candidates competing in the recent race, seven received law
degrees at either a state university law school or at a private in-state university, and
three received degrees at small out-of-state colleges, Ohio Northern, Capital University
(Ohio), and Stamford in Birmingham, Alabama.
12 See SmTH & BAmnE-, supra note 24.
2
3
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Only barristers are allowed to serve as advocates in trial and
appellate courts, but more importantly, only barristers are eligible for appointment to the High Court, Court of Appeal, and
the Judicial Committee in the House of Lords. Circuit judges
who serve on Crown and County courts must be barristers as
well, although solicitors can be appointed as circuit judges if
they have served five years as a recorder, a part-time judge in
the County Court. Moreover, academic lawyers on university
law faculties are not eligible for the judiciary.
In reality, then, recruitment to the bench in England, a
process controlled tightly by the central regime at Westminster,
is limited to members of the barrister branch of the legal profession, which constitutes only about 10% of the country's lawyers. And since the division between the solicitors and barristers
branches is rigid (one cannot be both a solicitor and a barrister
simultaneously), the threshold recruitment pool for English judges
is extremely small. But these figures still exaggerate the actual
size of the recruitment pool, since appointment to the circuit
bench requires at least ten years' standing as a barrister, and
appointments to the superior courts, both trial and appellate,
normally require fifteen years service. Reducing the recruitment
pool even further is the fact that judges for the superior courts
are drawn only from members of the Bar who are Queens
Counsel, those senior barristers who, upon the advice of the
Lord Chancellor, are privileged to "take silk." This elite stratum
of the barrister profession numbers only about 500. In short,
the consequence of political and occupational centralization is
that the recruitment pool of English judges is extremely small.
In fact, if we eliminate, as we must, those barristers who inevitably are not interested in judicial careers, those not available
for recruitment, and those not tied closely and properly to the
current government, the recruitment pool of English judges is
narrowed to, literally, a handful of barristers who constitute the
effective pool of judicial recruits.
III.

CARACTERISTICS

OF APPEALS COURT JUDGES

Thus far I have been describing a variety of contextual
factors that shape the recruitment of judges in England and the
United States. But what are in fact the characteristics of the
judges recruited through these systems? Can we say that the
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divergent recruitment pools and elite selectorates in each country
select judges with divergent social background profiles? Are
these profiles pluralistic in the American setting, reflecting the
pluralism of American society, and elitist in the English, reflecting the combined effects of centralization, unity, and a relatively
closed recruitment process? Alternatively, it is the case that the
formalities of recruitment, divergent as they may be, nevertheless
produce judges with comparative profiles, thus confirming a
variation of the "law of increasing disproportion" that "no
matter how we measure political and social status, the higher
the level of political authority, the greater the representation for
high status social groups. ' 33 My discussion earlier about the
social background characteristics of American judges suggested
that the persons selected to the judiciary reflect a strong, nonrepresentative bias. I wish to address this issue more systematically at this point by comparing the characteristics of English
and American appeals courts judges, those sitting on the twelve
American federal courts of appeals and on the Court of Appeal
in England. Both of these courts constitute the intermediate
appellate tier in their respective systems.
Table 1 provides a summary profile of the two sets of judges
based on the kinds of characteristics for which comparable data
exist. The differences between the two groups are indeed striking
in certain respects. First, while most American appeals court
judges are white and male, the fact remains that some attention
is paid in the recruitment process to drawing women and minorities to the bench. We should not, however, overlook the
fact that most women and minorities were appointed by a single
president, Carter, during a single term in office. Nonetheless,
the data on American appeals court judges show that the system
does pay at least some degree of attention to the symbolic politics
of American pluralism. By contrast, the English appellate court
is closed to people from such groups, at least in the sense that
the politics of judicial recruitment has not drawn such groups
to the high appellate bench.

11R.

PuNm,

supra note 15, at 33.
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Table 1
Characteristics of American and English Appellate Judges
(Intermediate Appellate Court)
(in percent)
ECAb
USCAa
100
92.6
Gender
Male
7.4
0
Female
100
92.1
White
Race
0
7.9
Non-White
Judicial
100
58.7
Experience
Yes
0
41.3
No
Occupation
52.8
100
Judiciary
at Appointment
9.3
0
Teaching
0
29.6
Law
0
8.3
Other
Law School
93
31.6
Education
Prestigious
68.4
7
Non-prestigious
a Drawn from Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments: The
Battle of Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324-39 (1987). These data are for appointees during the Johnson through Reagan administrations. N-216.
b Collected by the author. Data is for Lord Justices of Appeal on the Court
of Appeal during 1983, 1984, and 1985.
The data in this table also show that the appellate benches
in the two courts diverge in terms of the permeability of the
recruitment process, that is in the extent to which judges are
drawn from professional groups outside the judiciary itself. Although about 59010 of American appeals court judges have had
prior experience on the bench, it is a more telling clue about the
politics of American pluralism that a large proportion (41%)
have had no prior judicial experience whatsoever. Moreover,
although 52% have been on some other bench just prior to being
appointed to the court of appeals, the fact remains that a substantial proportion were drawn from other public and private
occupations. By contrast, all judges on the English Court of
Appeal have had prior judicial experience and, in fact, all have
served on one of the three divisions of the High Court below.
Of the thirty Lord Justices of Appeal who served on the Court
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of Appeal from 1983 to 1985, 57% had served on Queen's
Bench, 23% on Chancery, and 20% on Family Division. Thus,
the lower judiciary, and the High Court specifically, serves as
the only stepping stone position to the English Appeals Court.
Lateral entry from law school teaching facilities, private practice,
or government service simply does not exist in this system.
Finally, differences exist in the educational backgrounds of
the two groups of judges, which speak volumes about the effect
of pluralism in one system and unity in the other. American
appeals court judges display a variety of educational experience.
For example, while all attended law school and are thus not
representative of the population at large, only about 32% had
attended prestigious Ivy League schools. Another 29% attended
private law schools that were not Ivy League, and 39%, the
largest category, attended public-supported law schools. In other
words, 68% attended what we can classify as "non-prestigious"
law schools. Again, the differences compared with England are
dramatic. Although England has far fewer law schools than does
the United States, and fewer still during the years these judges
would have been at a university, it is nevertheless impressive
that virtually all of them (93%) attended either Oxford or Cambridge, the two elite universities in Britain. In fact, the concentration of educational backgrounds is even more intensive, since
more than half of the Lord Justices of Appeal (53%) attended
either Trinity or Magdalene College at Cambridge, or New or
Corpus Christi College at Oxford.
Since education background provides important clues to
judges' socialization experiences, it is important to note that a
substantial portion of English appellate judges have attended
elite fee-paying, or "public," schools prior to going to a university. In large measure whether or not a person attended a
fee-paying school, and especially one of the prestigious "Clarenden" schools, serves as a useful indicator for identifying family social status. Fee-paying public schools have a long tradition
of serving the educational needs of the economic and social elite
of Britain and for preparing the children of the privileged class
for university education, principally at "Oxbridge." Of the Lord
Justices of Appeal who sat on the Court of Appeal from 1983
to 1985, 87% attended a fee-paying school, and of these 46%
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attended one of the especially prestigious Clarenden public
schools.
A.

Party Effects

To this point I have not discussed the partisan characteristics
of English appellate judges. It may seem odd to have avoided
this particular background characteristic since party affiliation
is one of the more important contextual social background variables affecting judicial recruitment. 34 Party affiliation is clearly
an important background characteristic for understanding the
recruitment of federal appeals court judges. Of the 216 judges
appointed to the American courts of appeal from the Johnson
to Reagan administrations, about 96% were drawn from the
same political party as the administration. One should not underestimate the significance of this party factor. One reason, of
course, is that a number of studies show that the party affiliation
explains some of the variance in judges' voting behavior.3 5 But
perhaps more important, the fact that appointments to the federal bench are drawn all but exclusively from within the ranks
of the president's party suggests that swings in the pendulum of
national politics affects the segment of the recruitment pool from
which judges are drawn. Accordingly, changes that occur in the
political arena of national party coalitions embrace to some
extent the characteristics of judges recruited to the bench. In
large measure, those changes affect the political ideologies of
the judges recruited since the group of judges appointed by
successive Republican and Democratic administrations tend to
vote comparably. 36 It also affects to some extent the characteristics of the judges selected. For example, although few women

E.g., consider the observation made by Sheldon Goldman and Thomas Jahnige
concerning the effects of political party on the recruitment of federal judges: "As far
back as statistics have been gathered, judicial appointments have primarily gone to
members of the President's party." S. GOLDmAN & T. JAMHUGE, supra note 4, at 46.
11E.g., Goldman, supra note 9, at 501 (showing that for American appeals court
judges, political party explained 15% of the variance on one issue, economic liberalism,
and 17.7% of the variance on labor cases, but considerably less variance on eight other
issues examined).
36 See R. CARP & C. RowLAND, POLICY MAKING AND PoLITcs IN THE FEDERAL
DISTRICT COURTS 51-81 (1983).
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have been appointed to the federal appeals courts, 757o of those
who were appointed were recruited by the Johnson and especially
Carter administrations. Similarly, of the non-white persons appointed, 82% were recruited by these Democratic administrations. We can thus see that party affiliation provides an important
linkage between recruitment politics and national politics, at least
to the extent that the characteristics of nominees seem to change
given the administration in power.
This interaction between shifts in national politics and the
impact of partisanship upon recruitment to the bench-shifts
that keep appellate appointments attuned to national political
trends-is virtually non-existent in contemporary England. There
is some evidence that party had been an influential factor in
appointments to the bench in the last century and early this
century when public officials recognized the importance of partisanship. As Salisbury wrote to his Lord Chancellor, Lord
Halsbury, the "unwritten law of our party (was) that party
claims should always weigh very heavily in the disposal of the
highest legal appointments. ' 37 Available data bears out this linkage: of the 139 judicial appointments made between 1832 and
1906, eighty were members of Parliament, and eleven had been
candidates for a seat in Parliament.3 8 Another study showed that
2300 of the superior court judges had been members of Parliament or parliamentary candidates earlier in this century.3 9 In
recent years, however, and especially once Halsbury left office,
the influence of partisanship on judicial recruitment has diminished, at least in any overt way. Data reported by Henry Cecil
shows that by 1972 only 13% of the superior court judges had
parliamentary linkagesA0 C. Neal Tate has provided the most
exacting analysis of this trend. Using data encompassing 1876
to 1972 he shows that while party affiliation generally affected
recruitment to the appellate bench, the relationship was espe-

11R.

HEUSTON, LrvEs OF THE LORD CHANCELLORS, 1885-1940, 52 (1964).
See H. LASKI, STUImmS OF LAW AND POLmCS 168 (1932).
11 J. GRIFFITH, supra note 12, at 27 (citing THE ECONOMIST, "JUDGES
3"

Up" 946-47 (December 15, 1956)).
G~aRnr, supra note 12, at 26-27 (citing H. CECIL, THE
40 J.
ed. 1972)).
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cially significant between 1876 and 1908 and much less so between 1909 and 1972.41
B.

Elite Change

If we assume that the characteristics of judges, representing
as they do one segment of a configuration of institutional elites,
provide evidence about the characteristics of judicial and political systems, we must also recognize the inevitability of change
in elite structures. 42 Before examining change over time as such,
it is useful to examine cross-sectionally how the characteristics
of English judges compare with the characteristics of other British elites. The data in Table 2 provide one such comparison in
the context of educational backgrounds in the elite fee-paying
public schools. These data show that 80%V0 of High Court and
Appeals Court judges attended such schools. Of the other elite
groups represented in the table, only the highest ranking officers
of the Royal Navy and Army, ambassadors, and directors of
major insurance companies show higher degrees of representation of this educational background. It is useful to note also
that the two other political groups included in this table, members of Parliament from the Conservative party and Conservative
party cabinet ministers, show rates that are lower than the members of the judiciary.
There is evidence that changes which have occurred in the
structure of the English elites have not penetrated into the judiciary and thus that the judiciary has been immune from a
more general process of elite transformation. The data in Table
3 address this issue. These data report the percentage of various
elites that had been educated in exclusive fee-paying public schools
between 1939 and 1983. These data indicate, in some respects,

41Tate, Paths to the Bench in Britain: A Quasi-Experimental Study of the Recruitment of a JudicialElite, 28 W. PoL. Q. 108-29 (1975) (observing that party shows
the weakest link to recruitment in the 1942 to 1972 period but seems to have been
marginally more relevant than in the 1909 to 1941 period. This suggests that party may
be somewhat more influential again.); see also B. ABEL-Smran & R. STaVNS, IN SEARCH
oF JusTicE 176 (1968).
41R. PuTNuM, supra note 15, at 166-214 (summarizing theories of elite transformation and data on the characteristics of a variety of political elites drawn from several

countries).
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Table 2

Public School Background of Elite Groups
Percent from
Public Schools
Total
14-year-olds in England and Wales

(1967)
Conservative MPs (1970)
Conservative Cabinet (1970)
Royal Navy (Rear Admiral and
above) (1970)
Army (Major Generals and above)
(1970)
RAF (Air Vice Marshalls and above)
(1971)
Ambassadors (1971)
HC and Appeals Court Judges (1971)
Church of England Bishops (1971)
Directors of 48 Major Industrial
Firms (1971)
Directors of Clearing Banks (1971)
Directors of Merchant Banks (1971)
Directors of Major Insurance
Companies (1971)
Governors and Directors of Bank of
England (1971)

642,977

2.6

82.5
80.2
67.4
67.8
79.9
77.4
83.1

Source: D. COATES, TH-E CONTEXT OF BarrIsH POLrrics 114 (1984) drawing
from T. NOBLE, MODERN BarrAw: SRucTr. AND CHANCE 314 (1975).

a remarkable transformation in the backgrounds of certain political elites. For example, the data show a substantial change in
the higher levels of the civil service, once almost the exclusive
domain of the graduate of the fee-paying schools. In 1939,
84.5% of the senior civil servants had attended such fee-paying
schools. By 1983 the figure had dropped to just over half (58.8%).
Similarly, certain sectors of the military establishment, particularly the highest levels of the Royal Air Force, show a dramatic
decline. High Court judges, by contrast, show a high and invariant level of public school background, with 80% having attended such schools in 1939 and virtually the same proportion
(79%) in 1983. Only ambassadors, among the groups portrayed
in these data, show comparable stability, although slightly lower
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than the levels shown for High Court judges. Viewed differently,
by 1983, of the groups included in this table, High Court judges
show the highest rate of affiliation with the exclusive fee-paying
schools.
Table 3
Percent of Selected Administrative Elites
Educated at Fee-Paying Schools, 1939-1983
Ambassadors
HC Judges
Major Generals and
Above
RAF
(Vice Marshall and
Above)
Civil Servants
(Under Secretary
and Above)

1939
73.5
80.0

1950
72.6
84.9

1960
82.6
82.5

1970
82.5
80.2

1983
76.3
79.0

63.6

71.3

83.2

86.1

78.9

66.7

59.1

58.4

62.5

41.4

84.5

58.7

65.0

61.7

58.8

AND SocI=r INBRITAIN: AN INTRODUCTION 166
(1985). Some of the data was extracted in part from D. BoYD, ELrrs

Source: M.MORAN, PoLmIcs

AND THEIR EDUCATION

93-95 (1973).

These data on educational backgrounds are but part of a
larger process of elite transformation that has occurred in Britain
during this century. By most estimates there have been important
changes in the elite structure in Britain both in terms of the
distribution of characteristics of office-holders and a convergence of social background factors among different political
groups. Conservative members of Parliament, for example, are
no longer the bastion of privilege they once were. Conversely,
Labour members of Parliament are more likely in recent years
to contain the characteristics of their conservative counterparts.
For example, in the period from 1918 to 1935, 7.4% of Labour
members of Parliament had attended an "Oxbridge" college. By
1983 that number had increased to 14.4%, still small by absolute
standards, but nevertheless a substantial increase in proportional
terms. 43 In fact, change in the composition of England's institutional elites parallels changes in class structure and politics
" See M.

MoRAN, PoLrIcs AND SocITy iN B=rrw: AN INTRODUcTION 155 (1985).
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generally. There is evidence, for example, that the influence of
class structure upon politics, especially party and electoral politics, is declining in England as class allegiances have weakened
over the past several decades. 44 Yet the preponderance of evidence suggests, again, that the judiciary has been immune from
these secular trends, at least insofar as social backgrounds of
judges are concerned. One study noted that in 1820 about 67%
of English High Court and appellate judges came from upper
and upper-middle class backgrounds. It runs counter to the
secular trend of a decomposition of English elites to note that
by 1968 the figure had risen to 77%. By comparison, the proportion of judges from lower-middle class and working class
backgrounds, small to begin with, declined over that period from
14.1 % to 9.3 %. Thus in terms of social class origins, the higher
English judiciary has actually become more, not less, restric45
tive.
C.

Recruitment and JudicialDecisions

The distinctive features associated with the recruitment of
American and English judges are summarized in Figure 1 in
terms of the permeability of the recruitment channels, the size
(and characteristics) of the judicial selectorate, the effective recruitment pool from which judges are recruited, and the social
background characteristics of the judges. As the figure shows,
the characteristics of the judicial recruitment system in each
context are quite different: open, pluralistic, and heterogeneous
in the American context and closed, structured, and homogeneous in the English context. Of course, in making such comparisons we must remember that those systems are different only
in a relative sense, since even the American system contains
attributes of elite recruitment. However, in a relational sense,
important differences highlight the features of the American
recruitment process. But having identified these differences, while
important in their own right for understanding the context of
" See generally D. BUTLER & D. SToCES, POLITICAL CHANGE IN BRITAIN: FORCES
SHAPINo PoLITcAL CHoIcE (1969); M. FRANKLIN, THE DEcLINE OF CLASS VOTING IN
BRITAIN (1985).
4" J. GRumrrs, supra note 12, at 25; see generally ELITEs AND PowER m BRITISH
SocsaTY (P. Stanworth & A. Giddens eds. 1974) (detailed study of British political elites).
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judicial recruitment, can we likewise identify any observable
consequences that influence the decisions handed down by American and English courts? To be more precise, how, if at all, do
the parameters of the social backgrounds of English judges
structure their decisions? Can social background theory enlighten
us at all in a context, such as the English, where a homogeneous
cadre of judges continue to dominate the judiciary?
Figure 1
Summary of Differences between American
and English Judicial Recruitment Systems
Characteristics
United States
High
Permeability of elite paths
Size and characteristics of selectorate
Broad
Recruitment base (lawyers in population)
Broad
Broad
Characteristics of judges

England
Low
Narrow
Narrow
Narrow

Several observers of the English political system suggest that
social background theory cannot enlighten us in such a context.
For example, R.M. Jackson argues that no relationship exists
between "the political antecedents and the decisions of judges.''
The reason for this, according to Jackson, is that little variance
exists in the judges' background experiences, and thus, such
political antecedents are not useful for explaining why English
judges decide cases the way they do:
English conditions tend to produce a certain measure of uniformity in the outlook of the judges.... Judges are of different political faiths, different religions or agnostic, and have
varying degrees of intelligence and cultural attainments. Yet
there is something that enables us to talk about the judges
almost as we do about the cabinet, tacitly postulating a body
of men whose varying inclinations will appear homogeneous.
This is not strange when we remember that the judges have
had careers that are in outline similar .... Successful barristers, and hence the judges, are not likely to be very critical of
the legal order. The existing system has brought them large
incomes and position and has produced a disposition to resent
change.47
4R. JACKSON, Ti
41

Id. at 471-72.

MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 470 (7th ed. 1977).
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One might question whether Jackson's premise about the
homogenizing effects of legal socialization in England should be
taken as proof positive that variance cannot exist in the decisions
of English judges. This is particularly true since even in the
United States, the wider variance in the social backgrounds,
attitudes, and values of a more diverse legal profession has not
produced an inordinate amount of overt conflict on appellate
courts. The relatively high dissent rate associated with the Supreme Court is a misleading indicator to levels of conflict in
American courts because dissent is not common below the Supreme Court level. Courts of appeal, for example, the intermediate tier of the federal judicial system where most American
appellate law is made and interpreted, have dissent rates of about
6% on average. State supreme courts have dissent rates of about
18%. As one study indicated, "very high levels of dissent are
still the exception in the fifty states. Only thirteen states had
'48
dissent rates at or above 25 percent.
Jackson assumes, and correctly so, that the absence of variance in judges' social backgrounds makes it impossible to explain, in a statistical sense at least, variance in judges' decisions
on the basis of background factors. Yet the absence of variance
in judges' backgrounds need not imply stability and consensus
in the judges' decisions. To observe homogeneity is not to suggest that decisions are value-free or that judges do not encourage
particular outcomes rather than others. Indeed, it is easy to
assume that social background has no impact at all in this
context or that social background would have no impact even if
greater diversity existed. Consider, for example, the observations
made by Max Beloff and Gillian Peele. After commenting upon
the homogeneity of judges' backgrounds they suggest:
Yet, the argument that as a result judges will be biased toward
the interests of their class or against certain sections of society
or display consistent political prejudices seems overstated. There
is a variety of opinions and outlooks within the ranks of the

4 Glick & Pruet, Dissent in State Supreme Courts: Patterns and Correlation of
Conflict, in JUDICIAL CONFICT, supra note 9, at 201 (S. Goldman & C. Lamb eds.
1986).
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judiciary on political matters and it is doubtful whether the
overall situation would be changed 49by the addition of persons
with a different social background.

D.

Does Recruitment Matter?

Jackson's observation can be used as a starting point for an
analysis of the decisional consequences set in motion by the
different recruitment models used in England and America. Insofar as the English context is concerned, Jackson submits two
propositions about judicial decision-making. 0 First, he suggests
that the homogeneous social background characteristics of judges
encourage a high degree of uniformity in the judges' perceptions
of law and public policy, a uniformity that we can assume
encourages consensus on the bench as well. In addition, the
homogeneity of outlooks is focused, according to Jackson, on
outcomes in decisions, at least in terms of the judges' inclinations
not to be critical of the existing legal order. This suggests that
judges tend to support the status quo and, as Jackson observes,
"to resent change."
I wish to examine the propositions empirically by focusing
on two sets of outcomes associated with decisions handed down
by the intermediate appellate courts in the United States and
England. Since the absence of variance in the social background
characteristics of English judges precludes a direct comparative
test of a hypothesis relating backgrounds to outcomes, I adopt
by necessity an indirect test. That is, since the recruitment structures in each system are distinctive, as Figure 1 seeks to summarize, is it possible to observe a divergence in decision-making
in each system along dimensions suggested by Jackson's appraisal of the English system? One dimension is conflict-whether
or not we can observe in the English appeals court less dissent
than in the American appeals courts. A second dimension concerns whether there is any greater likelihood of the English
judges supporting the "existing legal order," measured here for

,1 M. BELOFF & G. PEELE, Tim GowER~4ENT oF THE U.K.: POLnCAL AuTHoaTY
IN A CHANGNG

SocmrY 372 (1985).

" See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
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preliminary purposes as support for the government as a liti5l
gant .
The data in Table 4 address the question of conflict in
American appeals courts.5 2 The data are presented in a way that
seeks to take advantage of both the fact that eleven intermediate

appellate courts exist at the federal level, and that we can conceptualize conflict in each court as existing along a continuum.

This continuum ranges from those decisions in which no disagreement exists, as either a dissent or concurrence, to those in

which some disagreement exists (albeit minimal) in the form of
a concurrence, to those in which a dissent exists, and finally to
those where both a dissent and a concurrence exist, which is of
course the maximum amount of conflict that can occur in threejudge panels. These data underscore the exceptional consensus

that exists on federal appeals courts: 92.4% of the decisions
have no overt conflict whatsoever, only 1.4% have concurrences,

only 5.8% have dissents, and less than one-half of 1% have
both a dissent and a concurrence. Taken together, non-consensual decisions of any type constitute only 7.6% of the more than

10,000 civil appeals included in these data. But equally important, conflict, when it does occur, is not uniform across all

circuits. Instead, it is concentrated in the Second, Seventh, and
District of Columbia circuits, which account for almost one-half
(47%) of all non-consensual decisions. Conversely, a number of

51This analysis conceptualizes the government as a "superior" litigant when
opposing a variety of other litigants in civil litigation. See Atkins & Glick, Formal
JudicialRecruitment and State Supreme Court Decisions, 4 Am. POL. Q. 427-49 (1975).
This conceptualization parallels a number of other studies that have interpreted the
underlying structure of judicial outcomes in terms of support for "upperdogs" or the
"haves" as opposed to "underdogs" and the "have-nots." See, e.g., Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. &
Soc. REv. 95-160 (1974); Ulmer, Selecting Cases for Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 Am. POL. Sci. Rav. 902 (1978).
$2 These, and the following data on American courts of appeals, were collected
by the author in collaboration with Justin Green. They represent all published decisions
on the merits decided between 1965 and 1969. A total of 19,183 decisions are included
in the original data set. The data presented here include only a sub-set of civil appeals
in order that those data will be comparable in terms of general subject matter to the
data drawn for comparative purposes from the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal
of England. Also, because the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was created
after these data were collected, the data will not include information about the Eleventh
Circuit.
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circuits, especially the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth,
display very low levels of conflict.
Table 4
Conflict Configuration in United States Courts of Appeals
(in percent-civil cases only)

Circuit
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
District of
Columbia
Totals

None
97.2
86.7
92.4
92.4
95.3
92.1
88.1
95.6
95.0
96.5
81.6
92.4

Dissent
and
Concurrence Dissent
Only Concurrence
Only
.2
1.5
1.2
.7
9.5
3.0
.4
6.2
1.0
.8
6.1
.7
.3
3.7
.8
.0
6.3
1.6
.3
10.4
1.1
.3
3.5
.6
.4
3.5
1.2
0
3.1
.3
1.2
12.2
5.0
1.4

5.8

.4

N
600
1,092
723
765
2,217
987
877
654
1,125
636
645
10,321

The level of conflict on the English appeals court, at least
when measured by dissent, is also quite low (3.5%7o).53 This
dissent rate places it clearly at the lower end of the range we
observe for American appeals courts and about what we observe
in the Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Our first impression, of course,
would be to assume that virtually no manifest conflict exists in
the English appellate court, and thus this piece of data would

appear to confirm Jackson's impression about the effects of

1, These and the following data on the English Court of Appeal were collected by
the author. The large project from which these data are drawn was supported by the
Law and Social Science Division of the National Science Foundation (SES-86-7878). The
data base consists of all published and unpublished judgments produced by the Civil
Division of the Court of Appeal from 1983 to 1985. For further discussion of the data
base, and especially the significance of the civil, as opposed to the criminal, division in
the Court of Appeal, see Atkins, supra note 13. The Court of Appeal in England meets
in rotating panels of two and three judges. The dissent rate reported here is calculated
on the basis of three member panels only.
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homogeneity in the English judiciary. Indeed it is, on an absolute
scale, very low. Yet we must place this figure in context. For
example, the dissent rate in the English Court of Appeal is
comparable to what we observe in the Eighth and Ninth circuits,
albeit at the lower range of American federal appeals courts
generally. Thus, to observe that the English rate is quite low is
nevertheless to suggest comparability to what we observe in some
American courts of appeals.
Moreover, before we conclude that Jackson is on target
about a high degree of consensus on the English bench, we must
note that, unlike American appeals courts, judgments in the
English Court of Appeal are handed down generally seriatim
with each Lord Justice of Appeal giving a separate opinion if
he so elects. Very few judgments (about 3.5%) are "judgments
of the Court"-reserved judgments in which one Lord Justice
is assigned the task of preparing an opinion and with which the
other Lord Justices invariably agree. Most opinions delivered
seriatim are de facto concurring opinions, with each Lord Justice
addressing the issues and/or points of law he feels most salient
and compelling to the disposition of the case, albeit agreeing
with his brethren in most instances in the outcome.
The fact that about half of the decisions handed down by
the Court contain separate opinions suggests that we ought not
accept too quickly the proposition that the highly integrated and
centralized recruitment process produces judges with such a high
commonality of ideology and views that conflict is all but eliminated.5 4 In fact, since the Court of Appeal rotates judges across
panels of two and three judges, we cannot eliminate the possibility that panels which appear internally harmonious produce
decisions that differ from those produced by other harmonious
panels. Such an infrastructure of "dissensus" has been identified
on American appeals courts, and it is an open empirical question
whether or not the rotating panel system encourages dissensus
55
in the English Court of Appeal as well.
The question of the extent to which, if at all, seriatim judgments obscure, or
defuse, conflict on the Court of Appeal, is one of the additional problems currently
under investigation in the large project from which these data are drawn.
5 See J. HowARD, supra note 9; Atkins & Green, Consensus on the United States
Courts of Appeals: Illusion or Reality?, 20 Am. J. oF PoL. Sm. 97-115 (1976) (discussing
"dissensus" on American appeals courts).
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Support for Government Litigants

If we must be circumspect in accepting at face value Jackson's observations about the inevitable effects of judicial homogeneity upon conflict in England, so too should we look
carefully at whether or not English conditions breed an inordinate amount of support for the existing "legal order." It is not
my purpose here to examine in great detail patterns in decisions
handed down by the courts of appeals in each country. However,
I do wish to explore one facet of these decisions that helps us
evaluate Jackson's premise, at least in a comparative context.
Jackson is proposing that the highly integrated and elitist recruitment process in England draws to the bench judges who are
likely to support the status quo. Although there is no reason to
dispute that proposition as such, it does suggest a linkage between recruitment politics and judges' decisions. There is simply
not enough variance in judges' backgrounds in England, or
enough judges for that matter, to test that proposition as such.
But we can explore whether any evidence exists supporting the
conclusion that the diverse recruitment systems in England and
America produce divergent decisions that alert us to alternative
patterns of support for the status quo.
I wish to take a brief look at this issue by comparing the
rates at which English and American appellate court judges
support the government when the government serves as a litigant
in civil appeals cases. In this context, government serves as a
surrogate indicator for what other studies have referred to as
"superior" and "inferior" litigants, "upperdogs" and "underdogs," "haves" versus "have-nots. ' 5 6 The data in Table 5 provide a summary distribution of the extent to which superior
litigants-generally defined as the federal government and corporations-are successful in civil appeals decided by the United
States courts of appeals. If we assume 50% as a base rate for
success, then data show that some benefit accrues to superior
litigants when they oppose inferior litigants in the same case.
Yet the advantage is not necessarily all that great (on average
about 17%), and success rates do not vary appreciably across
circuits, ranging from 69.9% in the Second Circuit to 62.2% in
the District of Columbia Circuit.
16

See supra note 51.
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Table 5
Support for Superior Litigants in
United States Courts. of Appeals by Circuit
(in percent-civil cases only)
Circuit
Superior Litigant Success
First
67.6
Second
69.9
Third
65.8
Fourth
64.5
Fifth
65.2
Sixth
69.0
Seventh
69.6
Eighth
64.9
Ninth
69.6
Tenth
67.7
District of Columbia
62.2
All circuits
66.9

N
411
702
495
530
1,511
715
542
425
741
393
498
6,962

Table 6 provides a more informative array of these data,
displaying success rates for specific types of litigants when they
opposed each other in the same case. These data show that
superior litigants, and especially the national government, prevailed more regularly than others, and especially when the national government opposed labor unions, "others" who are
usually individuals, and corporations. Other types of superior
litigants did not prevail nearly as often and were more likely to
succeed at the average rate for all cases in the sub-sample or
below the average, as corporations did when opposing "other"
litigants.
In fact, we can aggregate the data differently and portray
more clearly the success of the government as a litigant in civil
cases decided by courts of appeal. Table 7 compares the success
rate of the government as a superior litigant with success rates
of other superior litigants, such as corporations and, in some
instances, state governments across all circuits. The data show
clearly the especially high rate of success for the government in
civil appeals. Moreover, when factoring out the government as
a superior litigant, the success rate of other superior litigants is
barely above the 50% level. Finally, we should note that the
data show that this relationship holds in all circuits except the
Eighth, and is especially strong in the Second, Third, Seventh,
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Table 6
Outcomes in United States Courts of Appeals
by Litigant Combination
(all circuits-civil cases-in percent)

Outcome
For
Against
Superior Superior
Litigant Litigant
Litigant Combination
National Govt. v. State or Local
31
68
84
15
National Govt. v. Labor Union
72
27
National Govt. v. Corporation
25
75
National Govt. v. Individual and "Other"
70
30
State/Local Govt. v. Corporations
68
32
State/Local Govt. v. Individual and "Othe :r"
64
36
Union v. Corporations
65
35
Union v. "Other"
44
56
Corporation v. "Other"
x = 68.8

N
44
209
1,882
1,511
138
171
191
62
2,359

33.2

and Ninth, where the government success rates are 79%, 75%,
77%, and 76% respectively.
Comparable data derived from decisions handed down by
the English Court of Appeal shows a remarkably similar tendency for the government to succeed. Since these data are derived from an entirely different data base we must examine the
issue in a slightly different way. The data set for the English
Court of Appeal allows us to examine the success rate of various
types of appellants, that is, the parties who are seeking review
of the decision below. The data in Table 8 compare the rates of
success for four general categories of litigants-the government,
corporations, noncorporate businesses, and individuals. These
data show, once again, the strong position of government litigants. In comparison with the success rates of other parties, and
the average success rate for all litigants (38%), the government
as a litigant-appellant fares exceedingly well. In fact, there seems
to be almost a pecking order of success across the categories of
litigants, but a pecking order in which the government's rate of
success clearly dominates that observed for other appellants.
A closer analysis of these data offers support for Jackson's
hypothesis about English judges' attachment to the current legal
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Table 7
Support for Government and Other Superior Litigants
in United States Courts of Appeals-by Circuit
(civil appeals only)
Percentage Victories for
Government as
Other
Circuit (N)
Superior Litigant
Superior Litigant
Gamma P
1 (380)
72.6
63.4
.34*
2 (660)
79.3
58.9
.46*
3 (472)
74.8
57.4
.38*
4 (501)
70.9
55.0
.33*
5 (1418)
74.4
54.7
.41*
6 (674)
72.9
62.1
.24**
7 (513)
77.1
60.5
.37*
8 (404)
66.8
61.7
.11 N.S.
9 (700)
76.0
58.4
.39*
10 (356)
73.8
61.0
.28***
DC (489)
69.2
52.5
.34*
All circuits (6567)
73.8
58.0
.34*
* <.001
**<.01
***<.05

Outcome
Appellant
Successful
Appellant
Unsuccessful

Table 8
Appellate Success in English Court of Appeal
by Type of Appellant
(in percent-civil cases only)
Type of Appellant
Government Corporations Business Individual
Total
53.6

42.9

37.1

35.1

38.3

46.4
100%
(194)

57.1
100%
(655)

62.9
100%
(89)

64.9
100%
(1838)

61.7
100%
(2776)

order. For example, when local and regional governments appeal
against judgments rendered below in favor of the central gov1 o of
ernment, local and regional governments succeed only 23%
the time. In other words, the central government prevails in such
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cases at an extraordinarily high rate (77/0). In other cases, where
the central government is the appellant, the Court rules 59% of
the time in favor of the government when the appellee is an
individual, 54/a of the time in its favor when the appellee is a
business entity, and 52% of the time in its favor when the
appellee is a corporation. By contrast, individual appellants lose
75% of the time to government appellees, and corporate and
business appellants lose to government appellees 64.7/a and 75%
of the time respectively.
CONCLUSION

This paper suggests a paradox in the relationship between
judicial recruitment processes and the role performed by judiciaries in their respective political systems. The paradox is that
the recruitment processes used in America and England seem to
be divergent models of how political systems select their judges,
divergent even in light of the numerous commonalities that exist,
or perhaps we assume exist, in the political and legal cultures in
each country. Yet, for all the differences to which we can point,
we nevertheless discover that on at least the two dimensions
examined in this paper, conflict and support for the government
as a litigant, the two systems converge in curiously similar ways.
How can we reconcile the "divergence-convergence" paradox
in order to place the issue of judicial election and behavior in
context? As a starting point, it is useful to observe that we can
sometimes overestimate the significance of social background
factors for explaining judicial behavior or at least lose sight of
the context in which they operate. As I noted earlier, most of
the promising research using social background to explain outcome has occurred in the context of the United States Supreme
Court, an institution that is, in many respects, an exceptional
court in what is by standards around the world an exceptional
judicial system. The utility of social background in explaining
decisions in other courts has been something less than impressive.
It fails to explain the little, and sometimes virtually no, variance
in outcomes. And the variance that is explained is either idiosyncratic to certain issues or lacking in any obvious logical
connection. Now a clue to unraveling this mystery lies in the
fact, as J. Woodford Howard has argued, that appellate court
judges are socialized rather effectively into a judicial role that

KENTUCKY LAW JouRN[V

[Vol. 77

encourages unity and consensus. 57 Divergent political attitudes
and ideologies brought to the bench by a relatively open, pluralistic, and politically driven recruitment process are submerged
below the prevailing judicial norms. Howard concludes in his
analysis that "the impact of judicial background characteristics
on voting outcomes [is] interactive and issue specific .... No
single background characteristic [is] a strong determinant of
voting outcomes across the board. ' 58 As Howard observes, the
impact of social backgrounds as a set of recruitment factors is
affected by "subject, situs, and situation." ' 59 In other words, the
range in which such factors can operate seems to be extremely
small and very much affected by context.
If relative heterogeneity in the American context leads to a
high degree of consensus on the American appeals courts, then
it would seem that consensus on the English Court of Appeal is
all but guaranteed. I have reviewed in this paper the characteristics of judicial recruitment in England that encourage both
consensus and support for the central regime. I suggest that a
singularly important characteristic of that recruitment process is
the educational and career path of barristers, which probably
sets the foundation for judicial consensus quite early. It is interesting to note in this regard that Louis Jaffee has commented
that "legal education is a significant factor in determining the
character of the judicial role.' ' In comparing the American and
English judiciaries Jaffee observes that undergraduate education
in America establishes a liberal foundation on which further
socialization is built, a foundation far broader than one finds
in England. Following Jaffee's observations, we should add that
while undergraduate education in America is a prerequisite for
entry into law school, law study in England, by contrast, occurs
in the context of the undergraduate education itself. The liberal
tradition instilled, according to Jaffee, in pre-law education is
either all but non-existent in England or at least muted to some
6
extent. '
Indeed, if socialization is the linchpin for breeding consensus
17
"
"

J. HowARD, supra note 9, at 87-124, 219-21.
Id. at 182.
Id. at 186.

61 L. JAFFEE, ENGLISH AND AMERICAN JuDnos As LAWMAKERS 105 (1969).
61 Id.
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we must be impressed by the fact that a barrister's training in
England occurs in the closed, and in many respects medieval,
atmosphere of the four Inns in central London. There, values
of consensus and restraint, and seemingly support for the centralized regime, are nurtured effectively. The small cadre of
Queen's Counsel who are available for recruitment to the bench,
moving lockstep from trial to intermediate appellate to final
appellate courts, harness this highly structured socialization process, one that seems to have more in common with old medieval
guilds than with open, diverse, and pluralistic contemporary
occupations.
We thus see how the convergence toward consensus and
support for central regime rule occur in each system notwithstanding divergent recruitment systems. It makes us pause to
think whether or not the narrow variance we wish to explain in
judicial decisions using recruitment systems loses sight of a proposition suggested by Wilbert E. Moore, one reaching in general
terms back to Jerremy Benthem, that the world is a "singular
system"; that there is a commonality or universality, of problems
facing political regimes, at least those regimes that are more
similar than different, and that universally adopted legal norms
are used to address such issues. 62 Moore emphasizes the convergence of educational values as a way of explaining the infrastructure of the "singular system2' While the roots of the convergence
are probably multiple and interactive, it does appear that the
kinds of specific problems I have addressed in this paper conform to such a world view.
One of the more salient findings in this research is the
"winning" position that the government occupies as a litigant
in the English and American intermediate appellate courts. I
wish to highlight this finding because it is part of a wider
tendency, documented in many studies,6 3 for the government to
occupy a central position in the distribution of judicial resources

62

See Moore, GlobalSociology: The World as a Singular System, 71 AM. J. Soc.

475-82 (1966); see also H. EmANNu, COl ARA=rw LEGAL Curruaxus 5 (1976); supra
note 10.
63 Support for this is found in a number of places. Cue theory research, for
example, shows that the government as the petitioning party affects the likelihood of
certiorari petitions being granted by the Supreme Court. See infra note 65.
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from setting the agenda to final decision on the merits. The fact
that the government as a litigant is able to be as successful as it
is suggests a relationship between litigant status and judicial
outcome not constrained either by institutional level, since the
strength of government litigants has been observed at all levels
of the American judiciary, or by political system context. Two
explanations for this tendency come readily to mind. One is that
the government, in both the American and English contexts, is
an effective litigant, structuring its activities in such a way that
it litigates only when it perceives a strong likelihood of success.
Thus, as a "repeat" player in the litigation game, the government is able to assess better than most other litigants the probability of success. By the same token, there is ample evidence to
suggest that courts, at least the United States Supreme Court,
responds favorably to the government as a litigant in organizing
the Court's agenda. 64
The line of research that suggests the government has resource and strategic advantages over other litigants, and thus is
more successful in court, postulates that judicial decisions are a
response to the relative strength of parties involved in litigation.
Yet an alternative view would postulate that the government
wins because judges, as members of institutional elites in the
government, are sympathetic to claims raised by representatives
of the regime. In effect, this view would argue that support for
the government is an ideological response as much as, if not
more so, than a response to the structure of litigation. The
problem with this line of reasoning is that although the presence
of the federal government as a litigant has much to do with
setting the court's agenda, at least in the Supreme Court, prevailing ideology on the Court sometimes supports "underdogs,"
as opposed to "upperdogs"-the Warren Court being an excellent case in point for this trend.
The fact that government litigants enjoy an advantage in the
English Court of Appeal, in the context of routine civil cases,
suggests that more is at work than simple resource advantage or

1, See, e.g., Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin, & Rosen, The Supreme Court's CertiorariJurisdiction: Cue Theory, in JuDiciAL DEciSION-MAKwG 111-32 (G. Schubert ed.
1963); Ulmer, The Decision to Grant or Deny Certiorari:FurtherConsideration of Cue
Theory, 6 L. & Soc. REv. 637-43 (1972).
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ideology per se. For example, while a cue theory 65 would assume
that litigant status helps judges filter larger numbers of cases,
there are several filters that already are built into the English
system. One is the "British Rule" on costs-the losing party
must pay its own costs and usually the costs of the winning
party as well. The cost factor means that a litigant may bear a
high price for frivolous appeals. In addition, legal aid is available
only to otherwise eligible litigants if the Legal Aid Society feels
an appeal has some minimal merit. Thus, the circumstances
surrounding the mobilization of litigation in England seemingly
suppress the importance of a party cue as a surrogate for worthy
cases. It therefore seems that English judges may be responding
more in terms of claims and perceived legitimacy of claims raised
by parties. It bears attention that, at least in the English context,
the government tends to prevail as both appellant and as appellee-in other words, both in cases where the government pursues
the appeal, and thus where it can pursue selectively, and when
it responds to appeals brought by others.
Why should the English Court of Appeal be so receptive to
the government's position? A partial answer to this question
may rest in the recruitment process, a process which is highly
integrated and centralized at the top and where advancement
from barrister, to Queen's Counsel, to trial judge, and to appellate judge is accomplished only with support from the central
regime. Thus, while recruitment processes in England and America diverge in some respects and converge in others, the context
of recruitment in England seems to be important for understanding some of the patterns embedded in decisions handed down
by the Court of Appeal.

6" A cue theory proposes that decision-making heuristics, the cues, make complex
problems more manageable. The type of litigant has been shown to be an important cue
in certiorari decisions made by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Tanenhaus, supra note 64.
S. Ulmer, Selecting Casesfor Supreme Court Review: An Underdog Model, 72 Am.
POL. ScI. REv. 902-10 (1978).

